Reference ID: 10PARIS71
Date: 2010-01-22 17:05
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Origin: Embassy Paris
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHFR #0071/01 0221744
ZNY SSSSS ZZH (CCY AD133C36 MSI9843-695)
R 221744Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8101
S E C R E T PARIS 000071
NOFORN
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION
H PASS TO HOUSE STAFFER KESSLER'S OFFICE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR AF PK FR
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL KESSLER ENGAGES THE FRENCH ON IRAN,
SANCTIONS AND AFGHANISTAN
REF: 09 PARIS 1671
Classified By: Pol M/C Allegrone for Reasons 1.4 b and d.
¶1. (C) Staffdel Kessler, representing the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, visited Paris January 12-14 to engage French
officials, non-government entities and the private sector
regarding Iran, sanctions, non-proliferation and Afghanistan.
With a main focus of discussing potential U.S. sanctions
legislation related to Iranian efforts to develop weapons of
mass destruction, the staffdel heard from a wide spectrum of
French players. Most of the opinions supported USG efforts
as France has been a strong ally, especially regarding Iran
and Afghanistan. While the usefulness of sanctions continues
to be debated, French officials said their government was
moving forward with haste, and bringing the European Union
(EU) with it, to prepare enhanced sanctions against Iran.
Even the French political opposition appears on board with
this plan. While challenges abound in Afghanistan, the
Government of France (GOF) remains firmly committed to NATO's
mission there. Total company senior representatives
explained to the staffdel members that its activities in Iran
are completely legal, small in scope and that it has not been
able to complete its buy out program there due to
foot-dragging by the Tehran regime. Highlights of Staffdel
Kessler's meetings in Paris are as follows. End summary.
IRAN: OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW
------------------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) In a January 13 meeting with members of Staffdel
Kessler, Francois Richier, Strategic Affairs Advisor to
President Sarkozy, addressed the issue of imposing enhanced
sanctions against Iran. Richier explained that the GOF was
developing a package of measures that largely targeted the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps because of its economic
holdings and its role as a weapons proliferator. This
package would include:
--Finance - The GOF is willing to include the Iranian Central
Bank in targeted sanctions, most likely through some of its
subsidiary bodies. Paris is also trying to target an Iranian
Sovereign Wealth Fund which it recently learned has a branch
in Germany. France would also seek to impose sanctions that
would cut Iran's ability to conduct "correspondent banking."
--Transport - These sanctions would ban Iranian ships from
ports and harbors in Europe. The French envision the
possibility of enhanced sanctions that would trace Iranian
ships that have been re-flagged to obscure their origin. In
addition, Iranian air cargo planes would be banned from EU
airports.
--Insurance and re-insurance - Given the limited number of
actors in the re-insurance industry, France believes
prohibiting re-insurance coverage in Iran would be an
effective sanction.
--Oil and Gas - Paris proposes a ban on technical cooperation
and investment in Iran, a well as prohibiting exports of
refinery equipment and spare parts for oil and gas
industries.
¶3. (S/NF) Richier said he expects the EU will agree to
"complement" any eventual UN Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) and France hopes for a short timeline to secure a new
UNSCR in early February before securing approval at the
Council of EU Foreign Ministers later that month. Richier
said that we will have to decide whether to accept grudging
Russian concessions in order to get a UNSCR that may be weak
and limited, or whether to "waste time" trying to lobby for a
UNSCR that will be, at best, only marginally better. Richier
noted that it would be helpful if the U.S. Congress did not
act on sanctions legislation at least until the UNSCR debate
is concluded and he said it might be best to have U.S.
sanctions legislation reference the new UN resolution.
Regarding potential Chinese opposition, he hoped for
agreement on a new UNSCR (as the prior ones were unanimous),
but would accept a simple abstention. Richier expects Russia
will support the measure because the Russians were "shocked"
by the discovery of the uranium enrichment site in Qom.
Nevertheless, the Russians still need time to adjust their
thinking to this reality.
¶4. (S/NF) European countries face three main difficulties in
deciding on sanctions against Iran, according to Richier, and
he outlined them as follows:
--Most European countries want a UN framework, including a
new UNSCR. Richier pointed out that a signal from the Obama
administration that we are also prepared to move forward
would be very helpful.
--Determining the nature of sanctions: Some EU countries want
to put the UN decision into EU law, but the French want to go
beyond that and target different sanctions that we are
unlikely to get from the next UNSCR.
--Some countries simply hesitate to support sanctions for a
variety of reasons, whether protecting their own economic
interests, or on ideological grounds. This is manageable,
but complicated by individual circumstances, according to
Richier.
¶5. (S/NF) The GOF remains concerned about enforcing
sanctions with Brazil and Turkey, said Richier, because both
have considerable ties to Iran. He said that Turkey has made
clear it does not want to suffer economically, as it has in
the past. Richier noted France's concern over Turkey's
"regional policy" towards Iran, whereas it views Brazil's
engagement as being more nave and possibly based on
misinterpretation of the Obama decision to try engagement
first (without Brazil knowing what limits on that engagement
should be).
¶6. (S/NF) Richier was skeptical that sanctions aimed at
exporters of refined oil to Iran would be effective, although
the GOF has pushed for this, because such a policy would
require a verification mechanism requiring an investment of
military ships along Iran's long coastline and other
resources. Richier believes such a policy would send a
signal to exporters worldwide, but it would be too hard to
implement, and would likely only dissuade the honest
exporters. When asked about French oil company Total and
pending U.S. congressional legislation, Richier replied Total
has not made new investments in Iran, although it is involved
in a buy-back arrangement and said sales of Total's refined
products in Iran are declining.
IRAN: MFA SHARES ELYSEE'S VIEWS
-------------------------------
¶7. (S/NF) On January 14, Martin Briens, the Foreign
Ministry's DAS-equivalent for Non-Proliferation, largely
confirmed what Richier had said, but he provided additional
information. Briens also highlighted French ambitions to get
a new UNSCR approved and implemented at the February 25
Foreign Ministers meeting. However he said "tough and fast"
in the UNSC was unlikely, so we would probably have to settle
for fast. A total arms embargo, which Russia had previously
opposed but China had not, would be a major victory, assuming
Russia actually supported it.
¶8. (S/NF) Briens asserted that the June election in Iran and
its aftermath had "changed the equation" within the EU with
respect to Iran. He allowed that pending U.S. measures will
"also enter into the equation." Several countries besides
France, including Spain, have come to the conclusion that it
is time to move from sanctions that specifically target
proliferation activities to ones that have a broader impact.
Given the delays in implementing the last UNSCR on Iran,
France and close partners had received EU approval to prepare
modalities of implementation "in parallel" to negotiations in
the UN. The GOF has come to the view that the EU should take
"autonomous" measures that are not merely a magnified
application of UNSCRs, but it is still unclear how far EU
partners would go in this direction. France has noted the
UKs adoption of a process to designate individual foreign
entities for sanctions and it is now considering doing the
same. The GOF also believes that national governments can do
more through Financial Action Task Force decisions made by
the G8.
¶9. (S/NF) In addition to the potential package of sanctions
outlined by Richier (para 2), Briens said the GOF wants the
EU to:
--Impose a "prior authorization" approach on all Iran Central
Bank transactions which would allow truly sovereign
operations by the Central Bank to be approved, but it would
allow greater scrutiny and control, and would slowdown the
processing of transactions.
--Cast a wide net in banning/targeting IRGC persons and
entities.
--Ban trade in equipment for internal repression and identify
people involved.
Briens shared Richier's doubts on the efficacy of trying to
block refined petroleum products ("the bad guys will just get
rich") but the technology and parts for the oil and gas
sectors, especially for refining should also be denied to
Iran. Finally, on the issue of gaining China's
participation, he suggested emphasizing regional stability
and recruiting countries in the region to put pressure on
China as well.
AFGHANISTAN: KARZAI NEEDS TO
FOLLOW UP ON INAUGURATION SPEECH
--------------------------------
¶10. (C) On January 14 Jasmine Zerinini, head of the GOF's
interagency Afghanistan-Pakistan cell, acknowledged that
public opposition in France to the troop presence in
Afghanistan has grown steadily over the past several years,
but that this has not resulted in calls for withdrawal or
even a significant change in strategy. Regarding
coordination between the International Security Assistance
Forces, Zerinini said that there had been a great deal of
improvement, but that the approach was still too fragmented.
She said that France has recognized for the past year that
the forces stationed in the north of the country were unable
to handle the growing insurgency there. General McChrystal
understands this, she added, but this has not translated into
action.
¶11. (C) On civilian assistance, Zerinini said U.S. and French
plans to deploy more civilians are unlikely to bear fruit,
because ultimately only the Afghans themselves can bring
effective development. However, she opined, the Karzai
administration has not shown that it is capable of doing
this. Although Karzai's inauguration speech in November was
a good first step, he has done nothing since then.
Therefore, she said, the London conference is coming far too
early - the goal of London was to renew our partnership with
Karzai, but this is difficult without a real roadmap for
progress from the Afghans.
PAKISTAN: REINFORCING POLITICAL RELATIONS
-----------------------------------------
¶12. (C) Zerinini said France is working to reinforce its
political relations with Pakistan, and was expecting
President Sarkozy to visit Pakistan "early in the second
quarter" of 2010. The GOF does not want to return to a
relationship based on military equipment sales, as in the
1980s, and is instead focusing on counter terrorism in
addition to economic and trade links. France is also trying
to support an EU-Pakistan dialogue, but she said Pakistan
makes it difficult by rejecting conditionality and attempting
to focus exclusively on economic issues. Zerinini said the
Pakistani government is eager for trade concessions, but does
not want any political dialogue unless it is focused on
Kashmir.
¶13. (C) On the role of the Pakistani military, Zerinini said
General Kayani has "learned the lesson of Musharraf" and was
staying behind the scenes. However, he is manipulating the
government and parliament, including to prevent change on
Pakistan's policy towards Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) along the Afghan border, and also to stir up
controversy regarding the Kerry-Lugar bill that ties
continued U.S. aid to increased civilian control of the
military. Zerinini also argued that the west had missed its
opportunity to push the Pakistani military to crush the
Afghan Taliban taking refuge in Pakistan. Citing Jalaladin
Haqqani as an example, Zerinini said in 2004 he had standing
as a leader in the jihadi community, but did not have the
organization to represent a significant military threat.
However, since then, large amounts of funding, predominately
from Gulf donors, have allowed Haqqani to create a network
that would be difficult for the Pakistani military to defeat,
even if it had the will to do so.
¶14. (C) Zerinini said that bilateral measures alone to
strengthen civilian government were unlikely to be effective,
and that more coordination was needed among donors,
especially the United States. She said the Group of Friends
of Democratic Pakistan, while imperfect, was designed to
transform Pakistan's political elite and give them more
leverage over the military. However, Zerinini said it is not
being utilized. She said the U.S. was making significant
efforts to help develop Pakistan's energy sector, but she
added "I have not seen any of this in the energy working
group of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan."
THE FRENCH LEFTIST OPPOSITION
-----------------------------
¶15. (C) Staffdel members met opposition figures from the
French Parliament and Senate including Deputy Pierre
Moscovici (former Minister of European Affairs), Senator
Jean-Pierre Chevenement (former Minister of Defense), Senator
Monique Cerisier ben Guiga (author of "Going Nuclear in the
Middle East"), and Deputy Jean-Michel Boucheron to learn
their views on Iran and the Middle East Peace Process. With
respect to Iran, the group generally thought President
Sarkozy's tone had been too harsh and they supported giving
dialogue more time to bear fruit. Moscovici was the most
alarmed at the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons
capability and he emphasized that he would not rule out any
means in dealing with it. Boucheron and Cerisier ben Guiga
accepted the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran with equanimity
because they felt Iran was only seeking to enhance its power
rather than seeking to use nuclear weapons for hostile
purposes, while Boucheron was more concerned that the West's
focus on this issue was preventing movement on a host of
other issues where Iran might be helpful, including Iraq,
Afghanistan, Lebanon and Gaza. Chevenement said he was
prepared to support sanctions on Iran, but he argued that
achieving progress towards peace between the Israelis and
Palestinians would be the most effective way of improving
relations with the Iranian regime.
¶16. (C) The group generally agreed that the USG was not
moving fast enough on the Middle East peace process.
Moscovici thought President Obama could both be a friend to
Israel, as well as being firm when necessary. The opposition
members said the USG was not putting enough pressure on
Israel and that the temporary settlement freeze announced by
the Nentanyahu government is inadequate. The group's
expectations for what the Obama Administration could
accomplish in the Middle East were high, and the perceived
absence of concrete results could lead to disappointment on
the French left.
FRENCH ENERGY MAJOR TOTAL IN IRAN
---------------------------------
¶17. (C) Total's Vice President for International Relations
Hubert des Longchamps told staffdel members that the
company's current activities in Iran are legal. Much in line
with recent statements (see reftel), Longchamps said Total's
focus is on recouping funds, in the form of cash payments,
from previous investments in the development of Iran's oil
and gas blocks. He added that Total has no operational
responsibility in the South Pars field, and talks to finalize
buy-back arrangements to reimburse Total a "few hundred
thousand dollars" should have ended in 2008. In addition,
Total provides limited technical services to the Iranians to
safeguard its remaining property interest. Longchamps said
to walk away from these interests would only reward the
Tehran regime. He added that Total from "time to time" sells
excess gasoline supplies to Iran when demand drops in Europe.
Longchamps did not quantify the value of this trade, but he
said if such deals carried a high political risk, Total was
willing to forego the business. He reiterated that there is
no existing regulation prohibiting such sales, and if Total
withdrew entirely from the refined petroleum product markets,
the Indians, Koreans, and Chinese would remain active
players.
18 (C) Like other energy companies, Total plans to return to
Iran in the future when the political situation improves,
Longchamps explained. Therefore, Total offers financial
support to local communities to develop social and medical
projects. These programs help maintain a dialogue with the
Iranian society and is a channel of communication that Total
wants to keep open. He pointed out that Total has not
violated any U.N., EU or French laws. Longchamps cautioned
the U.S. against imposing sanctions in Iran because they
would hurt typical Iranians without impacting the political
leadership. When the Total Vice President asked the staffdel
if pending U.S. legislation could penalize energy companies
for selling refined petroleum to Iran, staffdel members
responded the legislation could possibly impact Total's
recent shale-gas investments in the U.S.
THINK TANK: EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS
--------------------------------------
¶19. (C) French officials are divided over the effectiveness
of sanctions as a response to Iran's continued pursuit of
nuclear enrichment, according to Bruno Tertrais, senior
researcher at the Foundation for Strategic Research (a think
tank focusing on international security and defense issues
whose main client is the GOF). Tertrais told staffdel
members that he believes sanctions can be efficient, but he
noted the importance of defining the end goal. He stated the
purpose of sanctions on Iran is not to stop the nuclear
program immediately but to exert pressure on the regime and
to elicit a gradual change. He listed the successful use of
sanctions in the past on four different countries -- South
Africa, Libya, Iraq, and North Korea -- the fact that
sanctions on Iran have put a strain on its imports, and the
accelerated debate within Iranian leadership as factors that
back the argument that sanctions can be effective. He
caveated his statements throughout the meeting by saying
sanctions would be ineffective if nothing was done to address
the black market and business circuits to Dubai. Regarding
the GOF's stance on sanctions, Tertrais noted that the Office
of the Presidency (Elysee) was more supportive of further
sanctions and mindful of strategic issues than the MFA, which
tended to take a regional approach and be more dovish.
Tetrais stated that the history of the late 1980s showed that
the more pressure foreign governments placed on the Tehran
regime, the more the Iranians backed down.
¶20. (C) Embassy comment: Staffdel Kessler's engagement with a
broad audience on these issues helped advance our mutual
understanding of the challenges and strategies to advance our
common interests in Iran and Afghanistan, and on the
effectiveness of sanctions.
¶21. (U) Staffdel Kessler did not clear this cable.
RIVKIN
Reproduced from cablegate.wikileaks.org
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