Pakistan’s northernmost occupied areas of Kashmir are again aflame. It is Gilgit Baltistan (GB), whose importance to Islamabad is about a hundred times more than the small slice of territory known as ‘Azad Kashmir’, abutting as it does with China, Central Asia and Afghanistan. And its people — long subjugated and ignored — are angry; so angry that it has been 11 days now of protests in freezing weather. So angry that they have come out in massive crowds; and yet again, are demanding that a traditional route leading into the Kashmir valley be opened for trade. It’s time India took notice and it’s time the world took notice of what is essentially the last colony on Earth. It’s unlikely though. While the Indian channels somewhat covered it, the world media ignored it completely.
The protests
Trouble started, or rather re-started in November last year on cuts in wheat subsidies to the region, following the severe crisis in wheat imports from Ukraine. Critics, however, say that the region, which is under a government led by Imran Khan’s party, has been deliberately kept short of essentials which may be true since protests were seen in 2021, this time due also to substandard wheat from Pakistan, with party workers of the ruling party also joining in. The present protests are also fueled by severe power cuts, for some 18-22 hours a day. It is ironic, given that it is GB’s hydropower which drives the Pakistan economy. The final straw, however, has been the continuous land grabbing by the state. Land, like anywhere else, is the one issue that could lead to a complete breakdown in relations with Pakistan, particularly since it has been a long time coming.
The land issue
Remember that the land laws of GB were inherited from the Maharaja of Kashmir, and even earlier from the days of the Sikh empire. Before this, the land belonged to a village with clearly defined boundaries. Later under Dogra rule, a unified formal system was instituted that was implemented unevenly depending on the extent of control. At the time, the land was divided into three categories for revenue collection. While individual ownership was recognised for cultivated areas, the rest of the land under common use of the people was owned by the state. A number of rajas were allotted lands while paying tithes to the Maharaja. After the tragic division of the state, a Pakistani agent was appointed to oversee a land that was never brought under the Constitution. Successive governments used presidential orders to keep changing aspects of governance, aimed at establishing Islamabad’s absolute control over the area.
In the absence of a uniform system of government, land records and their interpretation were further eroded. With the instituting of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that critically entered the country through Gilgit Baltistan, land became not just more valuable, but also an issue of vital interest. The state began to poach on community and pasture lands, even while it contested deemed khalisa (waste land) with rules of compensation being uneven from district to district. One example was the acquisition of land for the Maqpondas Economic Zone (meant to fast-track the setting up of Chinese industry) where compensation was not provided as it was for other CPEC projects. Unhappiness has been building up over the government takeover of land under a law of 1894, ‘in public interest’, which led to swathes of land being taken up for the Karakorum Highway, the vital link to China. While locals initially welcomed it in the hope of greater profits, customs revenues of Rs 1 billion in just the first week of December were gone into federal pockets. Neither is compensation fair for those displaced by the 98 hydropower projects including the large Diamer-Bhasha dam, which needed some 14,000 acres of private transferred to WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority) of a total of 37,419 acres acquitted for the project. Worst of all is the illegal allotment of khalisa lands to mafias and organisations from the mainland. There have also been reports of mining leases being given to Chinese companies in the area, where valuable gems and strategic minerals abound, all of which are further eroding local land rights. But what local lawyers contest is that in the light of UN Resolutions on Kashmir, the land is not Pakistan’s to allot, acquire or sell.
The Chinese interests
All of this is a major problem for Islamabad’s tight clasp of the Chinese hand, which is where the interests of the military lie. It’s not just CPEC, there are also plans to build connectivity to Tajikistan, and earlier, a loan of $4.8 billion was sought from international financial institutions for setting up a railway track through Afghanistan to the Central Asian connectivity node in Uzbekistan. All this is of vital interest to Beijing, given its plans for greater connectivity and growth for its restive Xinjiang district. Also vital are its various projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK), including massive plans for agriculture. The CPEC Master Plan has ‘end-to-end’ plans including the provision of seeds, fertiliser, credit and pesticides, where Chinese enterprises will also operate their own farms, and processing facilities for fruits and vegetables and grain. Logistics companies will operate a large storage and transportation system for agrarian produce. Beijing has seen a steady drop in arable land, and the risk of drought has furthered the need for alternative lands to cultivate. People’s demands for land reforms that give local government increased control would work against its interests. At the same time, Chinese banks will hardly give credit to an enterprise where the ownership of land is contested.
Caught in a cleft stick
China has encouraged Islamabad to consider absorbing the area as a full-fledged province, which would enable it to extend Pakistan’s land laws to the area. In 2018, veteran diplomat Sartaj Aziz headed a committee which was tasked with looking at the entire question holistically. It recommended de-facto integration of GB with Pakistan but not a de-jure change since that would affect Pakistan’s ‘principled position’ on Kashmir. It recommended delegating further legislative, administrative and financial powers to GB to enhance people’s sense of participation, by devolving more powers to the Legislative Assemblies. Needless to add, eventually Islamabad reacted with the Gilgit-Baltistan Order 2018 which effectively reversed some marginal freedoms granted earlier by removing an entire tier of government and remanding the powers to the Prime Minister. This created protests across party lines, with this being called an ‘Emperor’s Ordinance’ and subsequent appeals to the Supreme Court. The court refused to oblige, merely asking the Central government to give equal rights to the people as enjoyed in Pakistan. That never happened either. Imran Khan introduced the idea of turning it into a province just before the elections but abandoned the idea as his party came to power. The point is that any change in the status of GB requires a constitutional change – after all, it is not included in the ‘territories’ of Pakistan – and that requires a parliamentary majority. The present government which is following its own disastrous ‘game of thrones’ in Punjab, has little ability to change the status quo in the region. Chief Minister Khalid Khurshid has asked protestors – which include the Students Council and the umbrella Anjuman Tajran Baltistan – to give him a month to sort out these issues. Given the precedent, nothing much is likely to happen. People will be lucky if this doesn’t get worse.
Turning to India
Apart from the issues raised above, there’s another key demand that is going to be difficult to accept at any level — the call for opening the road from Skardu to Kargil, and Turtuk to Khapalo to allow all-weather trade and movement of people. Social media is rife with such demands and have been for some time. Kargil-Skardu road was once part of the old Silk Road, with natural connectivity to the rest of Kashmir, quite unlike the tortuous route to Islamabad. The maximum distance between the two cities is about 170 km, taking less than eight hours, unlike the 13 hours to reach Islamabad through a route often closed in winter. The trouble is that Islamabad has refused to even discuss Gilgit Baltistan, even when the heydays of Composite Dialogue made the opening of other routes possible. Now with the Kartarpur corridor opened, there is renewed hope in GB of making their future easier with an economically sensible route, which is also why the demand has become more strident. With Pakistan in an economic squeeze, there is a realisation that the only way to some measure of prosperity lies towards India.
As protests worsen, Islamabad has two choices. It can use its usual tactics of force to batter down people’s will. Second, it can make the region a full-fledged province, giving its people equal rights with the rest of Pakistan, and turn the Line of Control (LoC) into a border through which it can legitimately trade. The move will also close its stance on Kashmir once and for all. It’s a nice problem. China will encourage such a move, including the opening of trade routes, through which cheap Chinese goods will flood Kashmir. India will hardly welcome either move, given its legitimate claim on the occupied areas. It’s an interesting cocktail of clashing interests, particularly the dislike of locals to being turned into a Chinese colony. Meanwhile, as of now, it’s a Pakistani problem of no uncertain proportions. Unlike the past, it’s likely that the people of GB will not be put off by uncertain and unreliable promises. It’s time Delhi took notice. It just might be time to talk again about reviving this elusive branch of the Silk road.
The author is a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. She tweets @kartha_tara. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the stand of this publication.
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