Wikileaks Cablegate: To avoid hurting Pakistan, Turkey didn't invite India
Wikileaks Cablegate: To avoid hurting Pakistan, Turkey didn't invite India
The latest WikiLeaks expose of classified US documents include many with an India connection.

Cable 10ANKARA302, U/S BURNS' FEBRUARY 18 MEETINGS WITH U/S

Reference ID: 10ANKARA302

Date: 2010-02-25 11:11

Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

Origin: Embassy Ankara

VZCZCXRO3002

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DE RUEHAK #0302/01 0561105

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

P 251105Z FEB 10 ZDK

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2242

INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE

RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 1577

RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 7044

RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC

RHMFISS/MNF IRAQ C2 OPS

RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU

RUETIAA/NSACSS FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//

RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000302

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2020

TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC MASS IR TU

SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' FEBRUARY 18 MEETINGS WITH U/S

SINIRLIOGLU

REF: ANKARA 263

Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) Summary: During February 18 "Shared Vision and

Structured Dialogue" meetings in Ankara, Turkish MFA

Undersecretary Sinirlioglu:

-- Appealed for "simultaneity" between Armenian Protocols

ratification and the Minsk Process;

-- Registered increasing GoT dissatisfaction with Iraqi PM

Malaki;

-- Expressed hope USF-I CG Odierno's engagement would elicit

substantive cooperation from the KRG against the terrorist

PKK;

-- Urged higher profile USG involvment in the Cyprus

reunification talks, and;

-- Confirmed GoT interest in further dialogue on missile

defense.

End Summary.

IRAN

----

¶2. (C) Burns strongly urged Sinirlioglu to support action to

convince the Iranian government it is on the wrong course.

Sinirliolgu reaffirmed the GoT's opposition to a nuclear

Iran; however, he registered fear about the collateral impact

military action might have on Turkey and contended sanctions

would unite Iranians behind the regime and harm the

opposition. Burns acknowledged Turkey's exposure to the

economic effects of sanctions as a neighbor to Iran, but

reminded Sinirlioglu Turkish interests would suffer if Israel

were to act militarily to forestall Iran's acquisition of

nuclear weapons or if Egypt and Saudi Arabia were to seek

nuclear arsenals of their own. He said the international

community's patience with Iran had been met with the Iranian

refusal, since October, to work with the P5-plus-1, the

clandestine enrichment facility near Qom and Tehran's recent

decison to enrich its low-enriched uranium to 20%. The

IAEA's creative proposal to fabricate new fuel assemblies for

the Tehran Research Reactor had stumbled on a technically

unfeasible Iranian counter-offer for a simultaneous exchange

in Iran of Iranian fuel for fuel assemblies. Carefully

constructed sanctions, Burns argued, targeting the

increasingly pervasive economic power of the Iranian

Revolutionary Guard Corps, would convey the international

community's unity and determination. "We'll keep the door

open to engagement," he stressed. A visibly disheartened

Sinirlioglu conceded a unified message is important. He

acknowledged the countries of the region perceive Iran as a

growing threat: "Alarm bells are ringing even in Damascus."

ARMENIA

-------

¶3. (C) Sinirlioglu appealed for "simultaneity" between

Armenian Protocols ratification and the Minsk Process. He

emphasized "a strong reaction" against the protocols among

ruling party MPs had to be overcome before the government

would hazard a ratification effort. He warned Congressional

passage of an Armenian genocide resolution would "complicate"

his government's domestic political calculations regarding

ratification. He said if something acceptable to Azerbaijani

President Aliyev can found, then "we can move" the protocols

forward. Sinirlioglu suggested Azerbaijan and Armenia's

announcement of an agreed framework for Minsk Group progress

would provide the GoT with the necessary political cover.

Burns inquired about the prospect for progress on a natural

gas deal between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Sinirlioglu implied

ANKARA 00000302 002 OF 005

Aliyev is holding an agreement hostage to Turkey's handling

of the protocols: "He doesn't trust us."

IRAQ

----

¶4. (C) Sinirlioglu registered the GoT's increasing

dissatisfaction with PM Malaki and fear that he is tending

"to get out of control." "He is preoccupied with his

political survival;" nevertheless, Sinirlioglu continued,

the GoT is in frequent contact with him. The MFA hosted

Maliki advisors Sadiq al Rikabi and Tariq al Najmi to

meetings 10 days prior. Sinirlioglu lamented Iran's efforts

to influence the election. He noted Saudi Arabia is also

"throwing around money" among the political parties in Iraq

because it is unwilling to accept the inevitability of Shia

dominance there. "We want a free, transparent and fair

election," he said, "we need to forestall a deepening of the

sectarian divide."

¶5. (C) After the March 7 elections, Sinirlioglu said, Turkey

would initiate an effort to connect Iraqi gas fields to the

Turkish grid via a 300 kilometer pipeline, costing USD 500

million. He asserted the pipeline could begin pumping within

two years. He alleged Iranian opposition to the pipeline

because most of Iraq's gas fields are in Kurdish and Sunni

areas. Sinirlioglu advocated a second pipeline that would

give Iraqi oil an alternative to the Gulf as a route to

Europe once the country is able to meet its OPEC quota. He

asserted the piplines' construction would pull the several

Iraqi communities together into a common project. The

creation of new "common assets," he said, could be more

important for its politically unifying effect than its

economic impact.

¶6. (C) Sinirlioglu registered his appreciation for USF-I

Commanding General Odierno's recent visit. He hoped for the

early drafting of an action plan that would elicit more

cooperation from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)

against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)

leadership harboring in northern Iraq: "We want the KRG to

understand that working with us is important."

ISRAEL

------

¶7. (C) Burns focused on Turkey's strained relationship with

Israel. Sinirlioglu argued "the problem is not bilateral,

but general." He attributed increasing regional country

frustration with Israel to the stalled Peace Process,

especially on the Palestinian track. He blamed the lack of

progress on Israeli intransigence, which caused regional

stake-holders to question Netanyahu's goals. He contended

the "humanitarian situation in Gaza," which is not a

punishment of Hamas, but of the Gazan people, fed Turkish

popular anger against Israel. Even so, bilateral cooperation

with Israel is continuing. Turkey is acquiring Israeli

military equipment, notably Heron UAVs. Direct flights

between the two countries are routine. Two-way trade is

healthy, he said, tourism has dropped recently, but "will

recover." Sinirlioglu described Israeli Defense Minister

Ehud Barak's mid-January visit as "very good." He noted the

MFA is exploring the possibility of arranging a meeting

between the two prime ministers on the margins of an

international gathering. Returning to a GoT obsession, he

recalled the Turkey-brokered Syria-Israel proximity talks,

"which were shattered by Cast Lead," Israel's December 2008

military operation in Gaza. Burns noted Syria places high

value on Turkey's role as a mediator and repeated Senator

Mitchell's statement that Turkey-brokered proximity talks can

make an important contribution to the Peace Process.

ANKARA 00000302 003 OF 005

SYRIA

-----

¶8. (C) Sinirlioglu contended Turkey's diplomatic efforts are

beginning to pull Syria out of Iran's orbit. He said a

shared hatred for Saddam had been the original impetus for

their unlikely alliance. "Now, their interests are

diverging." Once again pitching Israel-Syria proximity

talks, Sinirlioglu contended Israel's acceptance of Turkey as

a mediator could break Syria free of Tehran's influence and

further isolate Iran.

EU, CYPRUS and GREECE

---------------------

¶9. (C) Sinirlioglu said Turkey's EU accession is being

obstructed by the politically motivated objections of several

member states, notably France, Austria and Cyprus. He

reserved special criticism for President Sarkozy. He accused

France of changing the rules mid-game. He contended French

opposition to Turkey's membership is "deepening the cultural

divide" between Christian Europe and the Muslim world: "A

wider audience is watching this."

¶10. (C) He regretted perceived Greek Cypriot complacency

regarding the island's reunification talks: EU "membership

makes them invulnerable." Greek Cypriots, he said, want the

world to forget the progress achieved by the Annan Plan in

¶2004. They pretend relations between the island's two

communities are an internal affair, even though, by treaty,

it's been an international issue for 50 years. Talat's

cross-voting proposal, Sinirlioglu continued, should have

been a breakthrough, but the Greek Cypriots failed to react.

Downer is frustrated, Sinirlioglu alleged, and so are the

Turkish Cypriots. He implied the island's Turkish community

would register its frustration by voting out Talat as TRNC

"president" in April. He renewed Turkey's appeal for higher

profile direct USG involvement in the negotiations.

¶11. (C) Sinirlioglu welcomed Greek PM Papandeou's belated

response to Erdogan's October 30 letter seeking a frank new

discussion of the two neighbors' several long-running

disputes. He conceded Papandreou's delay is understandable

in light of his likely preoccupation with Greece's acute

financial crisis. Based on Papandreou's response,

Sinirlioglu said, Turkey expects to begin new talks with

Greece soon.

AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN and INDIA

-------------------------------

¶12. (C) Burns opened the discussion on Afghanistan with

praise for Turkey's military, training and development

contributions there. Sinirlioglu said Turkey had chosen to

focus on three Afghan challenges: "the marriage of Wahhabism

and Pashtun nationalism"; the chronic antagonism between

Afghanistan and Pakistan, and; the country's security forces

deficit. He said Turkey plans to address the first by

ramping up its education programs in Afghanistan; the second

by pursuing its trilateral Ankara Process, which sponsors

meetings of senior Afghan and Pakistani ministerial and

intelligence counterparts, and; the third by establishing a

police training center in Kabul that aims for a throughput of

5160 trainees per year. Keying off the last point, AMB Tacan

Ildem, who recently concluded an assignment as Turkey's NATO

PERMREP, declared the EUPOL police training effort in

Afghanistan a failure. He said the EU's criticism of

Turkey's unwillingness to work directly with EUPOL is

unjustified. He argued, since Turkey does not have a

security agreement with the EU and is excluded from the

ANKARA 00000302 004 OF 005

European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the GoT lacks a

legal basis on which to cooperate with EUPOL. "We would like

the EU to involve us not as a third country, but, in view of

our accumulated rights," as a candidate for membership. He

urged the USG not to coordinate bilateral agreements to

support EU operations but, instead, to route all cooperation

with the EU on security issues through NATO.

¶13. (C) Deputy Undersecretary for South Asian Affairs Engin

Soysal led the discussion on Pakistan. He described the

Ankara Process and the recent Turkey-sponsored Afghanistan

Neighbors Summit as Turkish efforts to assert regional

responsibility for South Asia's inter-linked problems. He

said Turkey had not invited India to the neighbors summit in

deference to Pakistani sensitivities; however, he claimed,

Pakistan understands attempting to exclude India from the

nascent South Asian regional structures would be a mistake.

He reported Indian Prime Minister Singh had requested

President Gul's assistance with Pakistan during the latter's

visit to New Delhi the previous week. Acting on that

request, Gul had phoned Pakistani President Zardari, who was

skeptical of Indian intentions. Gul is planning to visit

Pakistan later this year. Soysal said Iran is proposing a

quadrilateal summit, which would include Turkey, Afghanistan

and Pakistan, but that proposal had yet to generate

enthusiasm.

¶14. (C) Soysal, Turkey's former ambassador to Pakistan, said

the Pakistani military, though displeased with Zardari,

remains unwilling to intervene; nevertheless, senior

officers' patience may not be infinite. Zardari needs to

increase the democratic legitimacy of parliament. Soysal

offered. Nawaz Sharif has become a much more constructive

player.

¶15. (C) Soysal urged a NATO training role in Pakistan.

Picking up from Soysal, Tacan Ildem suggested NATO invite

Pakistani military officers to courses at Oberammergau.

BOSNIA

------

¶16. (C) Sinirlioglu registered the GoT's determination to

resist perceived EU efforts to exclude Turkey from the

Balkans, particularly Bosnia. He identified effecting

rapprochement between Bosnia and Serbia as Turkey's immediate

diplomatic goal for the region. Towards that end,

Sinirlioglu said, we convinced Haris Siladjdzic, who had been

in Ankara the day before, to cease references to Serbian

"genocide." The United States and Turkey have "agreed to

disagree" on the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Bosnia;

nevertheless, "we value your involvement in the Balkans."

BILATERAL EUROPEAN RELATIONS, NATO

----------------------------------

¶17. (C) Burns inquired about Turkey's bilateral relations

with Europe. Sinirlioglu briefly recapped Turkey's

unhappiness with Sarkozy. He described his country's

relationship with Austria as infected by the latter's ethnic

prejudice. He complained Belgium and Denmark are reluctant

to suppress terrorist PKK-affiliated organizations active in

their countries. Tacan Ildem added that, as part of the 2009

POTUS-brokered deal that had overcome Turkish objections to

the appointment of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO Secretary

General, Denmark had promised to clarify its legal

requirements prerequiste to acceding to Turkey's request for

the closure of Roj TV, a PKK mouthpiece. This still needed

to be done, Ildem said.

¶18. (C) Picking up from Ildem, Sinirlioglu recalled the

ANKARA 00000302 005 OF 005

POTUS-brokered deal had included an understanding that a

qualified Turk would be considered for Assistant Secretary

General. Instead, he said, a German of uncompelling merit

was selected. "We suspect a deal between Rasmussen and

Merkel." Ildem complained high-level positions should be

part of NATO reform: "We missed an opportunity with the

selection of the Assistant Secretary General." Sinirlioglu

added: "We let Rasmussen have Secretary General, because we

trusted you."

MISSILE DEFENSE

---------------

¶19. (C) Sinirlioglu inquired about Russia's reaction on

missile defense. Burns said the Russians are much more

relaxed towards the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) and we

hope to have more conversations on missile defense

bilaterally and, eventually, within the NATO-Russia Council.

Sinirlioglu recalled PM Erdogan's request in his recent

meeting with SECDEF Gates that the Iranian threat not be

highlighted to justify PAA.

¶20. (U) Participants:

Turkey

Undersecretary Feridun Sinirliolgu

Deputy Undersecretary Engin Soysal

Ambassador Reha Keskintepe, Director General for the Americas

Ambassador Tacan Ildem, Director General for International

Security Affairs

Ambassador Aydin Sezgin, Director General for Intelligence

and Security Affairs

Ebru Barat Gokdenizler, Deputy Director General for the

Americas

Serhat Aksen, Department Head, Americas

United States

Undersecretary William Burns

Ambassador James Jeffrey

Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina Kaidanow

Bridget Brink, NSC

Daniel O'Grady, Political Counselor

Tamir Waser, P Staff

Jeremiah Howard, Deputy Political Counselor - Notetaker

¶21. (U) Undersecretary Burns has cleared this cable.

Jeffrey

"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s

gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"

Reproduced from cablegate.wikileaks.org


List of India-related documents from the first batch of 226 documents released by WikiLeaks

(India-specific portions highlighted in bold)

- To avoid hurting Pakistan, Turkey didn't invite India

- Bahrain's King Hamad on India's role in Afghanistan

- UN Security Council expansion and India

- Indo-Pak relations and Musharraf

- Pakistan's obsession with India

- India critical of sanctions on Iran

- Saudi Arabia expanding relations with India

- 'Little to fear about India having nuclear weapons'

- Iran could follow India's path in going nuclear

- Differing opinions of US and India

- India benefitting from international security

- Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and India

- Nuclear facility safeguards in India

- Israel-India strategic partnership

- Non-proliferation and India

- Indo-US trade relations and foreign aid

- Sanctions and German business interests in India

- Some Indian-origin people supplying equipment to Iran

- Germany on US-EU position towards India

- Israeli relations with India

- Reliance Industries oil and gas exploration

- US-Indian economic cooperation and Indo-Pak relations

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